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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
·of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD D. SUTTON, HARVEY L. · 
RANDALL, GALE V. BARNEY and 
PAUL ANNELLA, a co-partnership, 
doing business under the name and style 
of BLFE FLA~1:E COAL COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
NICK 1IARVIDIKIS, FAYE OLSEN, 
CLARON GOLDING, :MALlO PECOR-
ELL!, FRANK SACCO, and .all others 
engaged in the picketing of the coal mine 
of the Blue Flame Coal Co.; and 
UNITED ~TINE vVORKER~ OF 
A1IERICA, 
Defendants and Appellants. I 
Case No. 
8587 
BRIEP OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS 
The parties will be referred to as they appe.ar be-
low, the respondents herein being the plaintiffs and the 
appellants, the defendants. 
The figures in parentheses refer to the page number 
of the Record. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about February 10, 1956, the coal mrnrng 
property involved herein was operated by Walter Oden-
dahl and Theron Odendahl, his son, under the firm name 
and style of Star Point Coal Company (96-97). Said 
company had only eight employees, including plaintiffs 
Harvey L. Randall, Gale V. Barney, and Paul Annella 
( 180). About said date, representatives of the em-
ployees contacted defendant Frank Sacco, then Vice 
President of District 22, "LT nited :\line Workers of 
America ( 177, 178) relative to fonning a local union 
of said mine workers at said mine to improve wages, 
hours, and working conditions thereat, and for other 
benefits. Thereafter all said employees, including said 
three plaintiffs Inet with the said Sacco and :\Ialio Pecor-
elli, international board men1ber of said union, and voted 
unanimously to join said union, signed Inembership 
application blanks for said purpose, and written author-
ization for payroll deductions of initiation fees and dues 
( 180, 181). Defendant Pe.corelli conununicated to said 
\Valter Odendahl, the actions of said e1nployees (186). 
Odendahl later told the said e1nployee8 there would not 
he any jobs for thenl if they joined the rnited :\line 
\Vorkers; that he would shut the 1nine down (269). 
Pecorelli had suggested to Odendahl that he continue 
operating the 1nine pending negotiations for a union 
eontract (18G). He refused. He did not want thmn to 
eome to work if they were going to belong to this union 
( :2fl!)). 
rrhere i ~ evidence that he coerced thr.ee employees 
into terminating their employ1nent (199) and declined 
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2 
a written invitation to 1neet with the representatives of 
said Union to bargain collectively for an employment 
contract (147). The Odendahls subsequently completely 
shut down said mine rather than to have the same 
unionized. 
On or about February 21, 1956, while said mine wa~ 
so shut down, plaintiffs Randall, Barney and Annella, 
three of the eight employees who voted to join said union, 
and plaintiff Sutton, obtained a lease of said mining 
property from the Odendahls ( 96, 97) ( 149), and there-
after entered into a so-called partnership among them-
selves. (Ex. D). Substantial financial benefits were re-
tained in said lease by the Odendahls (Ex. B). The 
question asises as to whether said lease was bona fide 
or shan1. It appears to defendants to be merely an at-
tempt to circumvent .and evade the issues involved in s'aid 
labor dispute, and to deny to the remaining five employ-
ees of Mr. Odendahl their rights under Section 7 of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, and Sec. 34-1-7, U.C.A. 1953, and to 
deprive them of their jobs n1erely because they sought to 
organize a union at said mine, as well as to deny then1 
the right to work under the provisions of the Utah Right 
To Work Act si1nply because of union activities. The 
said three former employees, who .are now plaintiffs, con-
tributed none of the property used in the partnership 
business and are allowed to withdraw the sum of about 
$22.00 per day which is the equivalent of the prevailing 
wage being paid to coal miners in Carbon County (133). 
All of the plaintiffs well knew of said labor dispute in-
volved at said mine .at the time said lease was made and 
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entered into, and had full knowledge and notice that the 
same was unresolved at said time. In fact, all of the 
plaintiffs, except Mr. Sutton, by voting to join the union, 
precipitated said labor dispute which continued under 
the new owners, to-wit: the plaintiffs . 
..... 1\.fter the plaintiffs leased the said mine from the 
Odendahls as aforesaid, they did not attempt to contact 
the defendants to settle said labor dispute. It was at 
defendants' solicitation that Sutton, Sacco, and Pecor-
elli met. Very little took place at this first meeting (110) . 
.Jfr. Sutton made no proposals. The second and last 
rneeting was held also at the suggestion of the defendants. 
One of the plaintiffs was absent therefrom (115). The 
sarne was very brief. Plaintiffs asked what the 
Union's proposal was with respect to settlement of 
the labor dispute, and the defendants replied in substance 
that defendants wanted the usual union contract ,,~hich 
was in force with nearly all of the coal operators in 
Carbon County and that said contract should embody 
terms of seniority of mnployn1ent (114, 116). The meet-
ing was friendly. There was no suggestion by anyone 
that plaintiffs should not operate their rnine pending 
negotiations for contract. Plaintiffs requested additional 
tin1e to con~ider defendants· proposal and to confer with 
the absent partner. The plaintiffs did not at said time 
n1ake an~· counter proposal or engage in any detailed 
di~em~~ion, u1ade no effort to cornpr01nise the differencBs 
hehn'Pn the partie~, and the yer~· next day after the last 
tlll'Ptinp; (Man·h 1) plaintiffs caused the trial court's 
tt>1npora r~· rl'~training order to be ~erYed upon the de-
t'nndants (1-t-, 15). Said restraining order was granted 
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ex parte without hearing any evidence thereon by the 
trial court and without compliance with any of the other 
terms and conditions set forth in Sec. 34-1-28 U.C.A. 1953. 
The five employees were never permitted to return to 
their jobs . 
. Moreover, the plaintiffs pursued the same anti-
union policies as their immediate predecessors toward 
said employees. It is defendants' position that by taking 
over said mine while there 'vas .an unresolved labor dis-
pute thereat, of which they had full knowledge and by 
pursuing the sarne anti-union policies toward said five 
employees as their predecessors, plaintiffs thereby 
assumed and accepted said labor dispute. See National 
Labor Relations Board v. New Madrid Manufacturing 
Co., 215 F. 2nd 908; Regal J(nitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B. 324 
U.S. 9, 65 S. Ct. 478; N.L.R.B. v. Atkins, 67 S. Ct. 1265, 
331 E.S. 398. 
Since said restraining order was granted, plaintiffs 
have made no effort whatsoever to settle said labor dis-
pute. Plaintiffs have been working said mine since lYiarch 
1, 1956 under the protection of said temporary rest.ain-
ing order, preliminary injunction and permanent injunc-
tion, 'all of which enjoined all picketing, making no 
distinction between peaceful or violent picketing (12, 32, 
75). The restraining order was granted upon a bond of 
$1,000 ( 12) and the prelin1inary injunetion upon a bond 
of $2,000 (32) bo,th of which are grossly inadequate. 
Defendants contend that there is a labor dispute exist-
ing in this case pursuant to Sec. 34-1-34, U.C.A. 1~53, 1and 
within the definitions contained therein. Said picketing 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. 5 
had comn1enced on or about February 23, 1956 insofar 
as the same affeeted the plaintiffs, and continued to the 
date of the service of said restraining order on March 1, 
J 956 ( 229)' ( 14, 15). 
The evidence shows that said picketing was estab-
lished and maintained by defendants Faye Olsen and 
Claron Golding, two of the original eight employees at 
said mine (271). They were joined in this picketing by 
persons sympathetic to them (191). Picketing was for 
the purpose of protecting the jobs of the remaining five 
e1nployees who continued their efforts to unionize the 
1nine and exercise their rights under Sec. 7 of the Taft-
Hartley Act, and Sec. 34-1-7, U.C.A. 1953 (227). The 
picketing was not violent ( 235) and occurred on a public. 
highway about seven 1niles from plaintiffs' 1nine (92). 
Said picketing constituted an exercise of defendants' fed-
eral and state constitutional rights of free speech and was 
for the purpose of acquainting the public and all people 
who traveled along said highway that there was a labor 
dispute in existence at said 1nine, the facts and circum-
:-;tances relative thereto, the issues involved and defend-
ants' position in regard thereto, all in peaceful, orderly 
and lawful manner. Another objectiYe of the pickets 
wa~ to atten1pt to cause plaintiffs to reeonsider the action 
of the three employees 'dw abandoned their fellow em-
ployP<'~ in the 1nid~t of their efforts to secure the benefits 
of union organization at said 1nine, in direct violation 
of thP agreement runong the eight en1ployees (:2:27) and 
thu~ protect the johs of the re1naining five e1nployees 
who had lost their jobs by reason of union activity. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
Defendants' position is that the s.aid picketing was 
for lawful purpose·s. Even in the absence of an employer-
employee relationship or labor dispute, peaceful picketing 
for union purposes has been held lawful. See Cafeteria 
Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S. Ct. 126, 
88 L. Ed. 58; D1~mmermuth v. Hykes, 95 N.E. 2nd 32; 
Journeymen Tailors' Union v. Miller's, 312 U.S. 658, 61 
S. Ct. 732, 85 L. Ed. 1106; AFL v. Swimg, 312 U.S. 321, 61 
S. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855; Jvlilk Wagon Drivers v. M eadou·-
moor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 61 S. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836; 
Bakery & Pastry Drivers' Local v. Wold, 315 F.S. 769, 
62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178. 
There is .ample evidence supporting the position of 
the defendants that no one was compelled to stop on said 
highway and the traffic thereon was not blocked or inl-
peded by said pickets and the latter did not interfere with 
anyone who wished to travel said highway (234); that 
said pickets did not intixnidate, thre.aten or coerce in any 
manner, anyone who was traveling from said mine or 
otherwise ( 234). The evidence is also to the effect that 
plaintiffs were pennitted to go through the picket line 
and were never compelled to turn back (234-5). Plain-
tiffs, however, did not cross the picket line on occasions 
because they did not choose to do so or due to appre-
hension on their part as to what might happen and not 
by reason of any conduct or acts on the part of the 
pickets ( 123). 
There is no evidence that the pickets at any time car-
ried or concealed any weapons of any nature (120) or 
that they stopped anyone from hauling co.al from said 
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mine at any time. The said picketing took place for about 
21j2 hours from February 23, 1956 to March 1, 1956, a 
total period of six days ( 284). There is evidence that 
the pickets were at the side of the road and not on the 
highway and that they hailed passing motorists but did 
not compel any motorist to stop; that they engaged in 
peaceful and friendly conversation with those who did 
stop (273). 
The evidence further supports the proposition that 
defendants Pecorelli and Sacco did not order, direct nor 
control in any manner the said persons engaged in said 
picketing, and did not .aid nor abet nor ratify the same. 
The evidence does show, however, that those who estab-
lished and maintained the picket line did from time to 
time seek inforn1ation and advice from said two defend-
ants (272), and in the course thereof defendants Pecorelli 
and Sacco cautioned representatives of the pickets that 
.all pieketing must be peaceful and orderly and there must 
be no violence, intimidation, threats or similar conduct, 
and that such precautionary 1ueasures are given to all 
1nembers of the defendant ~line \Yorkers who are en-
gaged in picketing, regardless of whether the organiza-
tion itself or individual1uen1bers thereof established the 
picket line. It is given out of .abundance of caution, 
g<'Iwrally. 
~rhr 1nain issue in thi8 case is whether or not the 
trial eourt had jurisdiction under the facts and circum-
:'! a ll<'P~ herein to issue its pennanent injunction and that 
<'V<'n if ~u<'h juril:'dirtion is assu1ned, whether or not the 
law and evidenee hrrein "~.arranted the granting thereof. 
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The said court's findings and permanent injunction indi-
cate that the court believed and accepted all of the testi-
mony of plaintiffs' witnesses, but that it arbitrarily re-
jected the testimony of defendants and their witnesses. 
It is very unusual for the truth to be all on one side ,and 
for th~ opposite side to be entirely unworthy of belief. 
The trial court was in error in issuing its permanent 
injunCJtion herein for the reasons hereinabove and here-
after stated. 
S~rATE~fEXT OF POIXrrS ON APPEAL 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO ISSUE ITS PERMANENT INJUNCTION HEREIN UN-
DER STATE STATUTES. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE 
PICKETING HEREIN FOR THE REASON THAT THE SAME 
WAS NOT VIOLENT, BUT PEACEFUL AND FOR A LAW-
FUL PURPOSE. 
POINT IV 
PEACEFUL PICKE'TING IS THE LEGITIMATE EXER-
CISE OF FREE SPEECH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PUR-
POSE THEREOF IS TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS WHO 
OPERATE WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP TO JOIN UNION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that with 
respect to conduct proscribed under the Taft-Hartley 
Act, this area is exclusively reserved to the Federal 
Board, in the first instance, and thereafter to the Federal 
Courts, and by reason thereof the area is closed to the 
States. See Plankinton Packing Co. u. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S. Ct. 491 
( 1950), where the Court held in a per curiam opinion 
that proscriptions of the Wisconsin Labor Relations stat-
ute of the same tenor as those in the Taft-Hartley Act 
could not be enforced with reference to an employer over 
which the National Labor Relations Board customarily 
exercises jurisdiction. 
The smne principle thus enunciated with reference 
to employer unfair labor practices was carried over to 
union unf.air labor practices in Garner v. Teamsters 
Cnion, 346 U.S. 485, 7-l S. Ct.161 (1953). 
In the Garner ease, supra. a labor union peacefully 
picketed the pre1nises of an interstate trucking cmnpany 
in Penn~~·h·.ania. The picketing allegedly had for its pur-
po~e thP unionization of the company's en1ployees. There 
wa~ no ennt roYrrs~·, labor dispute or strike in progress, 
and tlw company had not objected to their employees 
joining tlw union. The e1nployer brought the suit. The 
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State Court enjoined the picketing as being in violation 
of the state labor relations act. The State Supreme Court 
on appeal, although finding that the object of the picket-
ing wa~ to force the employer to coerce its employees to 
join the union, concluded that the "grievance fell within 
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board 
to prevent unfair labor practices" and therefore state 
remedies were precluded ( 373 P.a. 19, 94 A. 2d 893). 
The F.S. Supreme Court upheld the State Aupreme 
Court, stating: 
"Congress has taken in hand this particular 
type of controversy where it affects interstate 
com1nerce. In language almost identical to parts 
of the Pennsylvania statute, it has forbidden labor 
unions to exert certain types of coercion on em-
ployees through the medium of the employer (cit-
ing 8 (b) 2 and 8 (a) (3), Taft-Hartley Act (346 
U.S. at 488). Congress did not merely lay down 
a substantive rule of law to be enforced by any 
tribunal competent to apply law generally to the 
parties. ***Congress evidently considered that cen-
tralized administration of specially designed pro-
cedures was necessary to obtain uniform applica-
tion of its substantive rules and to avoid these 
diversities and conflicts likely to result from a 
variety of local procedures and attitudes toward 
labor controversies." 
Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that although 
state regulation would merely duplicate federal regula-
tion, it would constitute a source of conflict and diver-
sity arising out of different procedures and attitudes. 
Although the conduct in question may be fitted into the 
category of an unfair labor practice, the State action 
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is not automatically precluded if the unfair labor prac-
tice may constitute conduct historically subject to state 
regulation and control. 
Activities protected by the Taft-Hartley Act are con-
tained in Sec. 7 of the Act, and fall outside the area over 
which the State has authority to act. The U.S. Supreme 
qourt, in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 
resting on the pre-emption postulate of the pre-Taft-
Hartley de·cision in Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), 
has declared that a State may not prohibit or condition 
the exercise of rights which the federal act protects. 
In Hill v. Florida, the state enjoined a labor union 
from functioning until it had complied ·with certain statu-
tory requirements. The injunction was invalidated on 
the ground that the \r agner Act included a federally 
established right to collective bargaining with which the 
injunction conflicted. In B'US Employees v. Wisconsin 
Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951), and Automobile Workers 
v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. -±5-! (1950), the Court invalidated 
state statutory strike procedures on this same general 
ground. The activities in said cases were held to be in 
conflict with, and a denial of, rights guaranteed under 
Sec. 7 of the Taft-Hartley A.ct. 
The N.L.R.B. has found the following to constitute 
unfair labor practices within the Ineaning of Section 8 
(b) (1) (A) of the Taft-IIartley Act: mass picketing, 
obstruction of streets and highways so as to prevent in-
g-r<>~s to or egn'ss fr01n a plant. (Sunset Line and Twine 
Co., 7!) N.L.R.B. 487, Sn1ith 1\Ifg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 886, 
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 8-! N.L.R.B. 563, Irwin 
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Lyons Lumber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 54). It will be noted 
that the court in its :B...,indings in the case at bar has 
found that the picketing involved herein allegedly blocked 
the highway leading to the mine of the plaintiffs (69). 
Since the federal board has found thG-t this constitutes 
an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act in the 
cases cited immediately above, the sar11e would preclude 
the trial court from awarding an injunction with respect 
to said conduct. In l~nited Construction Workers ~·. 
Lalmrmrm Constntction Corp., 347 r.S. 656 (1954), the 
Supreme Court "assumed'' that the F nion's use of 
threats of voilence on .a picket line to make employees 
join the union was a violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) 
of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
In the case at bar if this Court finds that the picket-
ing involved herein was violent, then the same would be 
a violation of Sec. 8 (b) (1) (A) of the T.aft-Hartley Act 
and the trial court had no jurisdiction thereof. 
In Garner v. Teamsters Union, supra, the U.S. Su-
preme Court expressed itself on pre-emption by saying 
that duplicatory state procedures would be stricken down, 
and then stated: 
"The detailed prescription of a procedure for 
restraint of specified types of picketing would 
seem to imply that other picketing is to be free 
of other methods .and sources of restraint. For 
the policy of the National Labor Management Re-
lations Act is not to condemn all picketing but 
only that ascertained by its prescribed processes 
to fall within its prohibitions. Otherwise it is im-
plicit in the act that the public interest is served by 
freedom of labor to use the weapon of picketing. 
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For a state to impinge on the area of labor com-
bat designed to be free is quite as much an ob-
struction of federal policy as if the state were to 
declare picketing free for purposes or by methods 
which the federal Act prohibits.'' 346 U.S. at 499-
500. 
The Court also said : 
"A state may not enjoin under its own labor 
statute conduct which has been made an unfair 
labor practice under Federal statutes.'' 
In Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, -1:81, 
the Supre1ne Court divides the field of pre-emption into 
two areas : proscribed and protected conduct. The Court 
concludes: 
"*** where the conduct if not prohibited by 
the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come 
within the protection afforded by that Act, the 
state court must decline jurisdiction in deference 
to the tribunal which Congress has selected for 
determining such issues in the first instance." 
The Court further held the pre-e1nption doctrine 
applies even where picketing violated the anti-trust la-w 
of .Jfissouri. (This was in direct conflict with Giboney 
r. EmJrire Storaqe & Ice Co. (1949), 336 r.S. 490, 93 L. 
11Jd. 834, 69 S. Ct. GS-t). The Court disposed of Giboney 
and all prior decisions li1niting organizational picketing 
hy saying: 
"Tlw l\1 issouri c.ourt relied upon Giboney *** 
for the proposition that a State Court retains 
jurisdiction oYer this t~·pe of suit. But Giboney 
\vas eoncerned solely with whether the ~tate's in-
junction ,against picl~eting violated the Fourteenth 
.. \ mPndn1ent. No question of federal pre-e1nption 
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was before the court; accordingly it was not dealt 
with in the opinion." 
The U.N. f--iupreme Court in Capital Serz:ice, Inc. r. 
N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501, held the Labor Board could ob-
tain injunctive relief from federal courts to prevent en-
foreelnent of state court's injunction barring picketing. 
in a dispute involving unfair labor practices under the 
Taft-Hartley Aot. 
Since the five employees in the case at bar wert> 
~n exercising rights guaranteed to thern under Sec. 7 of the 
Taft-H.artley Act, (F.C.A. Title 29, Sec. 156) to-wit: 
The right to self-organization to forn1, join or assist tlw 
labor organization involved herein and to bargain col-
lectively through representatives of their own choosing 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the pur-
pose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection, and s.aid rights under the federal decisions above 
cited are protected activities; they are activities under 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B., and state ac-
tion to enjoin said activities is precluded by the federal 
Act, unless the picketing is violent. The defendants con-
tend that said picketing was not violent and is, therefore, 
a protected activity under s.aid Taft-Hartley Act. For 
this reason the trial court had no right to enjoin the smne. 
Moreover, the V.S. Supreme Court held in N.L.R.B. 
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, that where .any mnount of 
goods crossed the state lines, whether directly or in-
directly, interstate commerce is affected and the Board 
(N.L.R.B.) has jurisdiction. 
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In the case at b.ar it is admitted in the testimony of 
Mr. Odendahl that approximately 40% of the output of 
the coal at the mine involved herein found its way into 
interstate commerce (295). ~ir. Sutton's testimony is 
substantially to the .same effect (207), (208). 
Defendants are aware that the Board itself ordi-
narily detennines its own jurisdictional standards on a 
Inuch more restrictive basis than the holding of this case 
and the Board can change those standards as it did during 
1954. However, the court should determine whether or 
not the Board has jurisdiction and the Board itself should 
not be allowed to make this determination. In the case at 
b.ar ·evidence lwas ;ffitroduced to the effect that the 
~.L.R.B. had declined jurisdiction (330, 331). Under the 
authority of the Fainblatt case, supra, the defendants are 
not bound by such determjnation by the Board itself 
and even though the Board declined jurisdiction herein 
under said authority, it would have jurisdiction, since 
40o/o of the output of said 1nine 'vent into interstate 
<'Ommerce. 
In the eyent of doubt as to whether or not the 
~.L.R.B. would or would not haYe jurisdiction, it has 
been held that the State Courts should not enjoin. See 
State Labor Board r. TT'ags Transportation Co .. 26 L.C. 
fiS. 7:l-l-. 
In Uuircrsal Car and Sen·icc Co. r. l.A.JI., :27 L.C. 
fiS. S:2;\ tlw ~I iehigan Court held that the ~.L.R.B. had 
juri~rliction wlwther it accepted it or not and that the 
~tat<- ronrt. thPrefore. could not enjoin even though 
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str,anger picketing was involved and the stranger picket-
ing was against the public policy of the state. Thereafter, 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took the s.ame 
position as the Michigan Court in the Universal Car case, 
supra, citing with approval the Michigan Court's state-
ment that jurisdiction must be based on ".actual jurisdic-
tion'' of the Board, not on "day to day, or month to 
month, discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Board." The Tenth Circuit Court further held that where 
the Labor Board has jurisdiction, such jurisdiction can-
not be vested or revested in a state court by the Board's 
refusal to act. It can only be done by the Board's for-
mally ceding jurisdiction pursuant to the requisite pro-
visions of the Taft-llartley Act. See Retail Clerks v. 
Your Food Stores, 225 F. 2nd 659, and Food Basket, Inc. 
c. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Kentucky Circuit Court, 
29 L.C. 69, 561. 
It is, therefore, sub1nitted that under the pre-emption 
doctrine and also under the interstate commerce doctrine, 
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to issue the in-
junction in this case and that jurisdiction herein w.as 
vested in the National Labor Relations Board under ,the 
Taft-HarUey Act and the federal decisions cited above. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION 
TO ISSUE ITS PERMANENT INJUNCTION HEREIN UN-
DER STATE STATUTES. 
The permanent jnjunction granted by the trial court 
under the facts and cjrcumst.ances of this case is pro-
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hibited under the s~tatutes of the State of Utah. The trial 
court did not have jurisdiction to grant the same there-
under. 
Sec. 34-1-25, U.C.A. 1953, provides, as far as appli-
cable herein, as follows: 
"No Court, nor any judge or judges thereof, 
shall have jurisdiction to issue any*** permanent 
injunction which in specific or in general tenns 
prohibits any person or persons from doing, 
whether singly or in concert, any of the following 
acts: *** (b) becoming or remaining a member 
of any labor organization or any employer organi-
zation, *** (e) Giving publicity to and obtaining 
or communicating information regarding the ex-
istence of, or the fact involved in, any dispute, 
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any 
public street or any place where any person or 
persons may lawfully be, without intimidation or 
coercion, or by any other method not involving 
fraud, violence, breach of the peace, or threat 
thereof, *** (k) Doing in coneert any or all of the 
acts heretofore specified on the ground that the 
persons engaged therein constitute an unlawful 
combination or conspiracy." 
The Court's injunction in the case at bar does vio-
lence to said statute. lTnder said Section the defendants 
had a right to be upon said highway leading to plaintiffs' 
mine, to give publicity to and to cmnn1unicate informa-
tion regarding the existence of or the fact involved in the 
labor dispute herein, and could patrol said high,Yay and 
Pngag<' in peaeeful eonYersation with p.assers-by thereon. 
TJH' :-;weeping tenus of the Courfs injunction prohibited 
tlH'lll frmn exercising these rights, since it restrained 
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all picketing, which would include peaceful picketing 
"·hich would prevent defendants from giving publicit~· 
to and obtaining or connnunicating infonnation regard-
ing the existence of, or the fact involved in, any dispute 
by advertising, speaking, patrolling the public highway 
involved herein, e~tc. The trial court's injunction issued 
herein w.as therefore contrary to the rights granted by 
the provisions of this section which is one of the labor 
law:;: of the State of Utah. 
Section 34-1-28, U.C.A. 1953, provides, as far as ap-
,. plieable herein, as follows: 
"No court nor any judge or judges thereof 
shall have jurisdiction to issue a temporary or 
permanent injunction in any case involving or 
growing out of a labor dispute, as herein defined, 
except after hearing the testimony of witnesse~ 
in open court ***, and except after findings of 
all the following facts by the court or judge or 
judges thereof: (a) that unlawful acts have been 
threatened or committed and will be executed or 
continued unless restrained; (b) that substantial 
.and irreparable injury to complainants' property 
will follow unless the relief requested is granted; 
(c) that as to each item of relief granted greater 
injury will be inflicted upon cmnplainant by the 
denial thereof than will be inflicted upon defend-
ants by the granting thereof; (d) that no item of 
relief granted is relief that a court or judge there-
of has no jurisdiction to restrain or enjoin under 
Section 34-1-25; (e) that complainant has no ade-
quate remedy at law; (f) that the public officers 
charged with the duty to protect complainant's 
property have failed or are unable to furnish ade-
quate protection.'" (1\Iy emphasis.) 
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I e1nphasize that said section provides that all of the 
facts therein enumerated must be found by the court be- -· 
fore it has jurisdiction to issue an injunction. One of the 
facts enumerated i.s in subdivision (c) of said section, 
which provides that the court must find before granting 
the injunction that as to each item of relief granted, -. 
greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the 
denial thereof than will be inflicted upon defendants by 
the granting thereof. The court made no such finding 
prior to granting the permanent injunction. Another 
fact enun1erated is in subdivision (f) which reads: "that 
the public officers charged with the duty to protect com-
plainant's property have failed or are unable to furnish 
adequate protection." The court did not make such a 
finding herein, and under the evidence it could not have 
done so. The testimony of Deputy Sheriff Charles Sem-
ken is to the effect that the Sheriff's Office of Carbon 
County was able to give such protection and that l\Ir. 
Sutton, one of the plaintiffs, ·was to notify said Sheriff's 
Office if any trouble developed (289). His testimony is 
that no call ,yas received by hun or to his knowledge at 
said Sheriff's Office of any trouble at said picket line 
( 290). ~ o testilnony was offered by the plaintiffs upon 
which the eourt could base a finding a8 required by sub-
division (f). 
rrhe Court, having failed to find on two of the 
grounds set forth in said section, and since by the e:s.-
prrss provisions thereof. it un1st find all of the said 
facts in said sec.tion or is prohibited fron1 issuing an in-
junction in the easP, it is respectfully subn1itted the eourt 
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by reason of its failure to so find committed error 1n 
issuing the permanent injunction. 
The defendants subrnit further that the plaintiffs 
failed to make a reasonable effort to settle the labor dis-
pute involved herein either by negotiation or other-
wise, and for this reason the court was not authorized 
pursuant to section 34-1-29, U.C.A. 1963, from granting 
plaintiffs' injunctive relief. 
Section 3-l:-1-30 U.C.A. 1953, provides, in part, as 
foJlows: 
"*** and every restraining order or injunc-
tion granted in a case involving or growing out 
of a labor dispute shall include only a prohibition 
of such specific act or acts as rnay be expressly 
cmnplained of in the bill of complaint or petition 
filed in such case and expressly included in said 
findings of fact made and filed by the court as 
provided herein; ***" 
The trial court's pennanent injunction herein pro-
vided, among other things: 
"It is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed 
that the defendants, '!.<**, and all persons in active 
concert or p.articipation with them, he, and they 
are hereby, permanently restrained and enjoined, 
from all picketing of said coal mine on what is 
commonly known as the 'Air Port Road,' or the 
approaches thereto, leading to plaintiffs' mine in 
what is commonly known as 'Dead Man Canyon' 
(75). ***" (My emphasis.) 
Thereafter certain specific acts are enjoined (75). 
We submit that when the court restrains "all picket-
ing," the enjoining of other specific acts thereafter is 
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1nere surplusage. The forbidding of "all picketing," of 
necessity, includes the forbidding of peaceful picketing, 
which the eourt has no right to restrain. We do not know 
of any statute or decision of this court authorizing the 
prohibition of peaceful picketing. 
Section 34-1-34 U.C.A. 1953, defines a labor dispute. 
Section 34-2-5 U.C.A. 1953 provides in part, as fol-
lows: 
"No such restraining order or injunction 
shall prohibit any person or per.Sons whether act-
ing singly or in concert, *** from attending at any 
place where such a person or persons mBy law-
fully be for the purpose of peaceably obtaining or 
communicating information, or from peaceably 
pursuading any person to work or to abstain from 
working; or fron1 ceasing to patronize or to em-
ploy any party to such dispute; *** or from peace-
ably assembling in a lawful manner and for law-
ful purpo~Ses; ***" 
Section 34-16-6 U.C.A. 1953, which is a provision 
of the Ftah Right to \\"'ork Law, provides as follows: 
··Any person, finn, association, corporation, 
labor union, labor organization or any other type 
of association engaging in lockouts, layoffs, boy-
cotts, picketing, work stoppages, or other conduct, 
a purpose of \Yhieh is to c01npel or forc.e any other 
1wr~on, finn, association, corporation. labor union. 
labor organization or .any other type of associa-
tion to violate any provision of this art shall be 
guilty of illegal conduct contrar~- to public policy; 
provided that nothing herein contained shall be 
construed to preYent or n1a.ke illegal the peaceful 
and orderl~· solicitation and persuasion by menl-
ber~ of a labor union, labor organization or any 
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other type of association of others to join a labor 
union, labor organization or any other type of 
association, unac0ompanied by any intimidation, 
use of force, threat of use of force, reprisal, or 
threat of reprisal." 
It will be noted that the provision cited from the 
Utah Right to \York Act (34-16-6) expressly states that 
nothing in said provision shall be construed to prevent 
or make illegal the peaceful and orderly solicitation and 
persuasion by members of a labor union, labor organiza-
tion or any other type of association of others, to join 
a labor union, labor organization or any other type of 
association, unacc01npanied by any intimidation, use 
of force, etc. Therefore, even the Utah Right to Work 
Act upon which plaintiff's action is allegedly predicated, 
expressly exempts peaceful and orderly solicitation and 
persuasion by members of a labor union to induce others 
to join a labor union or si1nilar organization. However, 
the forbidding of all picketing, which of necessity would 
include peaceful persuasion or solicitation, by the trial 
court in his injunction in the case at bar, is in direct 
conflict with the Utah Right to Work Act, .and the express 
provision cited above, and is therefore contrary to this 
statute of the State of Utah. 
The permanent injunction of the trial court in the 
case at bar makes no distinction between peaceful picket-
ing, peaceful persuasion, lawful patrolling of the high-
way, and unlawful conduct. It prohibits all peaceful, 
as well as, unlawful conduct. It cannot be sustained un-
der the express provisions of the labor statutes of this 
state heretofore cited. Therefore, under said statutes, 
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the trial court committed error in issuing the permanent 
injunction herein prohibiting all picketing, peaceful or 
otherwise. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE 
PICKETING HEREIN FOR THE REASON THAT THE SAME 
WAS NOT VIOLENT, BUT PEACEFUL AND FOR A LAW-
FUL PURPOSE. 
The defendants submit that under the evidence the 
picketing conducted by them was not violent, but was 
peaceful and lawful. Of course, the trial court, follow-
ing its usual pattern in this case, disregarded all of the 
evidence of the defendants and gave credence to the 
plaintiffs' testimony in toto. However, even under the 
plaintiffs' testimony, the picketing herein was not of 
the type which should have been enjoined. 
The specific acts found by the court upon which it 
is sought to justify the injunction appear to the defend-
ants to be as follows: 
1. That said pickets can1e out across the road lead-
ing to plaintiffs' coal mine and that plaintiff Sutton and 
Frank Steininger, an independent truck driver, either 
had to stop their respective vehicles or run over said 
piclwt~ (69). 
~- That said pickets infonned said Steininger as 
followt-': .. You hadn't better go up there," (from which 
languagP the court per1nitted hilnself to jump to the far 
fetehPd <'Onelnt-'ion that if said truck drjyer did proceed 
t.hP piekets would inflict or cause to be inflicted on said 
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driver, or his vehicle, great and .serious dmnage) (69, 70). 
3. That a picket infonned Lloyd Sutton, one of the 
plaintiffs, as follows : "vV e had orders to come up here 
and stop you," .and that when Sutton told the picket that 
if it was necessary he would get the Sheriff to come up 
to the Inine, the picket said : "vV ell, you better go get 
him" (70). 
4. That a bridge across the only road leading to 
plaintiffs' mine was blown out during the picketing, and 
the road strewn with roofing nails (70). (It is significant 
that the court did not find who was responsible for this 
eonduct.) 
5. That on i\1arch 19, 1956 (19 days after the picket-
ing wholly ceased), Faye Olsen, one of the above named 
defendants, shot and damaged the truck of Harvey L. 
Randall, one of the plaintiffs, .and the truck of said Stein-
inger ( 70). I will tre.a t these findings in the same 
order as they appear above. 
1. As to the blocking of the highway by the pickets, 
plaintiff Sutton himself testified that on February 23rd, 
the pickets had their cars parked to the side of the ro.ad 
and had a fire going there (101). He later stated that 
they carne out across the road and "we either had to stop 
or run over the1n" (102) .. Mr. Sutton testified that he 
was preceded by .a trucker, to-wit: Frank Steininger, on 
this particular occasion (103). 1\fr. Steininger testified 
he went up to the picket line on the 22nd day of February 
(21:)), but later testified that he did not know whether it 
was the 22nd or :2:~rd of February (219). l-Ie further 
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stated that when he first saw the pickets as he proceeded 
toward the mine, they were right along the side of the 
road ( 215), and that the road was clear ( 219). He was not 
even hailed by the pickets (219). Both Mr. Sutton and 
J\1r. Steininger were apparently talking about the same 
day. 
Claron Golding, one of the defendants who had ini-
tiated the picketing and who was at the picket line every 
day while the same was in progress, stated that he did 
not observe any of the pickets getting into the road and 
stopping trucks or other vehicles (231). As to February 
23, 1956, he testified that the plaintiffs came up in two 
separate trucks about 7:30 A.~I. and that the pickets 
were all on the side of the road by the fire and the plain-
tiffs just pulled up. He stated they pulled right over 
within three feet of the edge of that road and the pickets 
talked to then1 opposite the driver's sid~ (231). 
Defendant Kick ~Iarvidikis was on the picket line on 
February 2-±th and also February 27th (249). He was 
asked if on the days he was on the picket line 
whether he got out in the road to stop any cars or trucks 
or otherwise and stated that he did not. He further testi-
fied that he did not see anyone else do so: that he did not 
~PP anybody stand in the ro.ad and that he saw vehicles 
pa~~ up and down the road without being stopped; that 
thP piekd~ \H'l'P rig-ht at the edge of the pave1nent (251). 
Clayton "r orthPn, an in1partial witness, who hap-
JH'TIP<l to pa:-;~ on the higlnn1~· during the picketing, but 
rould not gin' the (_}xaet date, stated that he observed .a 
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group of fellows who had a bonfire at the end of the 
oil road and that these 1nen were to the side of the road, 
the east side. They were standing around talking as far 
as he could see, standing .around the fire ( 324). He fur-
ther testified he did not observe any men on the highway. 
On his way back, he stopped of his own accord and made 
son1e remark to the men that it was pretty cold weather 
to be out "picnicing" (325). 
Joe C. Lopez, one of the pickets, also testified. that 
the men were by the fire and that no body was on the 
highway .at any time when he was there (343). :Mr. Lopez 
further testified that the pickets did not stop Mr. Stein-
inger, but that he stopped by himself (343). He further 
stated that when Mr. Steininger stopped, two of the men, 
he and Mr. i\farvidikis, went over ·to the truck. The other 
men stayed by the fire ( 344) . 
Williain Beveridge, who was on the picket line Feb-
ruary 23rd about 8 :00 A.l\I. testified that no one stopped 
either j[r. Steininger on 1!-,ebruary 23rd or Jack (Lloyd) 
Sutton, (one of the plaintiffs). He stated the latter 
stopped hi1nself ( 365). 
\Yilliam R. Ward, another member of the picket line, 
testified that he was on the picket line February 23rd 
and February 24th and that when Sutton came up on 
February 23rd the pickets were not on the highway .and 
that no one flagged J\tir. Sutton; that Sutton stopped 
(368). 
In view of the conflict in the testimony of J\fr. Sut-
ton and l\1 r. Steininger regarding where the pickets were 
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on February 23rd, Mr. Sutton stating they came on the 
road and Mr. Steininger stating that they were along 
the side of the road and the overwhelming evidence on 
the part of the defendants' witnesses to the effect that 
the pickets did not stand on the road or block the traffic 
but cmne over after Mr. Sutton stopped voluntarily, it 
is defendants' contention that the court should have 
found that the said pickets did not block or impede 
traffic on said highway but that they were around the 
bonfire on the east side of the road. The evidence does 
not sustain the finding of the court and he had no reason 
whatsoever to disbelieve the numerous "'1-ritnesses pro-
duced by the defendants, since their testimon~T was not 
broken down .and there was no evidence assailing their 
veracity; under the circun1stances the court's finding 
that the pickets were on the highway was arbitrary and 
unjustified. 
2. Although plaintiff Sutton testified that he sent 
~1r. Steininger to the 1nine on February 23rd but told 
him if there was a picket line that he was to turn back 
and ~[r. Steininger ad1nitted on cross-exan1ination that 
Mr. Sutton had requested that he go to the n1ine on said 
occasion, the court found that the pickets informed l\fr. 
HtPininger, "You hadn't better go up there.'' The court 
was not justified in finding that these words, standing 
alone, n1eant that if the truck driver did proceed the 
pi<'k<'t~ would inflict, or c.ause to be inflicted, upon said 
driver or hi:-~ vehicle, great and serious drunage (69-70). 
The ~aid trn<'k driYPr wa:-~ already under orders from 
plaintiff Sutton to turn back if there was a picket line 
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at the road. There is no evidence that said words al-
legedly spoken by the pickets were spoken in anger, or in 
a thre.atening manner, or that they carried the threat of 
imminent danger if the truck driver proceeded. If 
spoken, they could well have meant that it would be 
better for all concerned if the truck driver did not pro-
ceed to ,the mine. The evidence does not disclose the tone 
of voice in which the words were uttered, if at all, or 
whether they were accompanied by any overt act, indi-
cating that force would be used if the trucker proceeded. 
An attorney n1ay advise his client that he had not 
better eng.age in certain conduct. This does not imply 
necessarily that force or violence will be visited upon the 
client if he acts contrary to the advice of his attorney. 
Of course, defendants' evidence gives a different 
version of the words spoken to the truck driver on said 
occasion . 
• Joe C. Lopez, one of the pickets, testified that the 
conversation with the said truck driver was as follows: 
"A. Well, all he said, that he wanted to go up. 
That that was the w.ay he was making his 
living. And our answer was that we was 
making our living by joining the union. That's 
all we said. But we didn't stop him. So he 
turned back." ( 345). 
}f r. Lopez testified further: 
"Q. Did either you or Mr. 1\iarvidikis say any-
thing to him about not being able to go up 
to the mine or where he was going~ 
A. ·we never did." (345). 
Of course, sinee 1\lr. Steininger was told by Sutton to 
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return if there was a picket line. He could well havC' 
turned back by reason thereof. The record shows that 
only ~fr. Lopez and Mr. Marvidikis spoke to 1\fr. Stein-
inger and that the other pickets remained by the fire 
(344). 
3. As to the court's finding that a picket informed 
Lloyd Sutton, one of the plaintiffs, as follows: "We had 
orders to come up here and stop you,'' and that when 
Sutton told the picket that if it was necessary he would 
get the Sheriff to come up to the mine, the picket said: 
"\Veil, you better go get hUn" (70). This language was 
allegedly spoken to l\Ir. Sutton on Februa:r:y 2/ (110-111-
112). Later that day plaintiff Sutton and other plaintiff~ 
proceeded to said 1nine ( 112). Again the alleged state-
Inents above, if spoken, do not necessarily mean that forre 
and violence would be inflicted upon ~Ir. Sutton or any of 
the other plaintiffs if the picket line ·were crossed. There 
was no threat that ~lr. Sutton was to be stopped by the 
use of force or violence. rrhe pickets could well have 
n1eant by said words, standing alone, that they had orders 
to stop :Mr. Sutton by use of lawful1neans, to-"it: peace-
ful persuasion. l\f r. Sutton was told he could get the 
Sheriff which is not consistent with the theory that force 
wa~ to be inflicted upon him. 
Again, we direct this Courfs attention to defend-
anb' evidence as to the said conversation with :Mr. 
Hutton. Joe C. Lopez testified as follows: 
Did von have a conversation with these two 
1nen ·in the pick-up f (Sutton was one of the 
men in the pick-up.) 
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A. Well he can1e up to us and he said, 'Are you 
going to let me through?' He said. 
Q. Now who said that? 
A. That second fellow, what's his name? 
Q. :Mr. Sutton? 
A_. Yes. And right away he s.aid 'If you don't 
I will just go get the law and go up.' We 
said 'Suit yourself.' He turned back. I don't 
know whether he came back all the way down 
to Price or not but he turned right back, I 
believe in about 20 minutes. He said, 'This 
time I got orders to go up.' 
(~. Now just a minute. He went down, you don't 
know where, but he came back, you say, in 
about 20 minut·es? 
A. Yes. And he said he had orders to go up .and 
see the property. Our answer was, 6You could 
have went up in the first place.' We didn't 
stop nobody. See. That's all that was said. 
Q. And what did he do then? 
A. He went right up." (347-348). 
Lopez' testimony seems fair and logical and the evi-
dence shows :J[r. Sutton did go up to the rnine without 
getting the sheriff and without any violence when he re-
turned within .about 20 rninutes after the first conversa-
tion. If the pickets really said they had orders to stop 
hj1u, why would they let him go through after he turned 
back and then returned? Is it not more logical to believe 
that because of J\ir. Sutton's apprehension of picketing 
in general, (hereafter discussed), he was :->i1nply taking 
rxtra precautions by stating that he would get the sher-
iff1 It is not clear where he went but he returned in 20 
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minutes .and said that he had orders to go through. He 
did not say from whon1 he received said orders and it 
does not appear that he was fearful of not being let 
through because he could have brought the sheriff to the 
picket line but did not do so and yet he was allowed to go 
through without any threats or violence of any kind. 
I cannot refrain from pointing out, however that the 
trial court, following its usual pattern throughout this 
case, accepts fully the testimony of the plaintiffs and 
without any cogent reason, rejects arbitrarily all of the 
testimony of the defendants. In the opinion of the de-
fendants, the three findings set forth above were the only 
findings upon which the injunction could possibly be 
based, because they are the only occurrences which plain-
tiffs allege and which the court found occurred at the 
picket line. The other two findings did not occur at the 
picket line. 
4. The fourth specific finding was that a bridge 
across the only road leading to plaintiffs' mine wa8 blm\'11 
out during the picketing, and the road stre·wn ,,~ith roof-
ing nails. It will be noted that the court did not make 
any finding as to who was responsible for said acts. 
There was evidence to the effect th.at a bridge on the road 
leading to plaintiffs' 1nine was partially damaged and 
~omeone had put roofing nails on the road (10-±). Xo one 
know~ who committed these acts. Xo proof whatsoeYer 
wa:-; ~nlnnittPd which connected or tended to connect the 
dPI'<>ndants, or Pither of them, with the co1n1nission there-
of. Deput:'T ~lwriff Se1nken testified he 1nade a thorough 
i1nrp:-;t igat ion in .an effort to detennine who the guilty 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r; 
32 
person, or persons, were, but was unable to do so (292). 
:Mr. Sutton testified that if he knew who the· persons 
where who committed said acts he would have them 
prosecuted ( 130). :Moreover, the pleadings of plaintiffs 
indicate they do not know who committed said acts. In 
the first complaint they were content to allege that 
"Plaintiffs believe, .and therefore allege, that the Defend-
ants are responsible for said destruction and malicious 
conduct ***" (2). (2\iy emphasis). After the court 
ordered said allegation stricken ( 45-46), the plaintiffs 
in their arnended complaint allege "That a bridge across 
the only road leading to plaintiffs' mine was blown out 
and the road strewn with tacks and nails and that plain-
tiffs are informed and believe and upon such informa-
tion and belief, allege that the defendants are responsible 
for said destruction, malicious conduct and intimidation." 
(49). No proof was introduced whatsoever to show the 
responsibility for s.aid acts. The defendants allege that 
said finding should not have been made because it does 
not connect the defendants with the acts alleged and it is 
highly prejudicial and unfair to the defendants. It is 
irrelevant because it is not and cannot be connected with 
the defendants, or any of them. If we wish to indulge 
in theory it is equally plausible to charge that the plain-
tiffs committed said acts in order to be able to make a 
showing for an injunction -- an injunction which they 
desperately wanted. There is evidence that Mr. Sutton 
was at the mine at about 10 :00 P.M. the evening before 
the said tacks were found and said bridge partially dam-
aged (288). However, courts are not interested in theory 
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but in cornpetent proof. Since there is no proof whatso-
ever in the record that defendants were responsible for 
said aets, the trial court should not have considered the 
san1e as constituting any basis upon which an injunction 
should have been issued .and said finding is immaterial 
in this case. The presumption of innocence, we take it, 
still prevails in this jurisdiction. 
5. The court found that on ~larch 19, 1956 (19 days 
after the picketing wholly ceased), Faye Olsen, one of the 
above named defedants, shot and damaged the truck of 
Harvey L. Randall, one of the plaintiffs, and the truck 
of ~Ir. Steininger. In desperation to show smne act of 
violence upon which to base the injunction herein, the 
plaintiffs of-fered and the court received, over the objec-
tion of the defendants, evidence to the effect that on 
March 19, 1956, Faye Olsen~ one of the defendants shot 
and damaged the truck of Harvey L. Randall, one of the 
plaintiffs and the truck of ~Ir. Steininger. This event 
occurred 19 days after the picketing had wholly termi-
nated and 7 days after the court granted the prPliminary 
injunction herein. The evidenee concerning :Jfr. Olsen 
was to the effect that he had been drinking considerably~ 
that he was .ang-ry about the loss of his job; and that he 
committed thi~ act without any suggestion frmn the other 
defendant~. In otherwords. he was on a ··lark .. of his 
own, although he had defendant Golding take hiin to 
where the trucks were (388-9). 
Defendants urge that this isolated act on the part of 
FaYP Ol~0n. 19 days after the picketing had ceased, has 
. . 
no <'onn<>etion with the other defendants. See N.L.R.B. 
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u. Deena Artu·ear, 198 JJ•. 2nd 645, which held that un-
authorized acts of violence by some of the striking em-
ployees during picketing are not chargeable to the other 
members of the labor union representing the employees. 
Therefore, this act had nothing to do with the other 
members of the picket line and c.annot be chargeable to 
them. Furtherrnore, this isolated act on the part of l\f r. 
Olsen was entirely outside the issues of this case and, 
therefore, ilmnaterial. rrhe plaintiffs had the opportunity 
to amend their pleadings to include this matter but chose 
not to do so. It is outside the issues as framed. Defend-
ants insist it was error on the p.art of the court to admit 
this evidence since it was not covered by the pleadings 
and defendants were not apprized of the same before-
hand. Further, it had nothing to do with the picketing 
\vhich had ended some 19 days before. It does not cast 
any light as to whether the picketing which took place 
frmn February 23, 1956 to l\1arch 1, 1956 w.as peaceful 
or otherwise. rrhere was no picket line in existence at the 
time of this isolated act on the part of :Mr. Olsen. He was 
acting entirely on his own initiative. Defendants direct 
the court's attention to the case entitled Cafeteria Em-
ployees Union v. Angelos, supra, in which the U. S. Su-
pre Court (after citing the ~feadowmoor ca.se, supra, 
to the effect that "***Right to free speech in the future 
eannot be forfeited because of dissociated acts of past 
violence"), said: 
"Still less can the right to picket itself be 
taken away merely because there may have been 
isolated incidents of abuse falling far short of vio-
lence occurring in the cour:se of that picketing." 
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Defendants take the position that all of the alleged 
words and acts specified above are isolated incidents and 
do not justify the injunction issued in this case. There 
is no causal connection between the isolated act of Faye 
Olsen and said picketing. Since it occurred after the 
preliminary injunction was granted the proper remedy 
for the court to have applied was a citation against Mr. 
Olsen for contempt. This would be consistent \\'"ith the 
authorities cited. Said act cannot be chargeable to other 
members on the picket line. See 1\".L.R.B. r. Deena 
Artu·ear, supra. 
The evidence shows that the real basis for this 
action was not the alleged abuses of the picketing herein, 
which are not sustained, hut rather plaintiffs' and Odell-
dahl's inherent fear of picketing in general, even though 
it \\'"as peaceful. 
It is clear from the record that neither 'y alter 
Odendahl nor the plaintiffs intended to cross the picket 
line. Both intended to respect it (1±6, 380) . .2\Ir. Odell-
dahl, when first advised by his e1nployees that a picket 
1 ine wa~ <'~ ta blished suggPsted. "that they do not attempt 
to go through the picket line. I told then1 that I wanted 
no trouble whatsopyer." (1±6). :Jlr. Odendahl abo testi-
fi<>d that the mine would be shut down eon1pletely if the 
union engaged in picketing (156). :Jir. Randall. one of 
t liP plaintiffs. called "Talter Odendahl h~'" telephone after 
find oh~<>rYing the picket line and before he went down 
to it. He told l\f r. Odendahl ·· * •• they had a picket line 
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out .and we would not go through and he told us not to 
because he didn't want no trouble" (166). 
Plaintiff Sutton testified that he intended to respect 
the picket line ( 380). He told Deputy Sheriff Semken 
that he was not going to run coal until the trouble was 
settled (289, 380). Sutton was also asked: 
"Q. Regardless of the reason, again Mr. Sutton, 
you did not contemplate hauling any coal on 
that highway while the picket line was there~ 
Yes or no. 
A. No." ( 382). 
Plaintiff Sutton further testified that none of the 
defendants made any threats against him of any kind 
(120). He was later asked: 
"Q. 'Vell, Lloyd, all I want to know is by either 
words or conduct did any of those pickets 
actually threaten you with any type of vio-
lence, bodily hann, reprisals, threat of re-
prisals or anything else if you went through~ 
A. They didn't threaten me bodily, no. But I 
didn't know if they would or if they wouldn't." 
(122). 
Sutton further testified that his men (the other 
plaintiffs) had no trouble getting through the picket 
line to his knowledge (123). In fact, there is no evjdence 
that the plaintiffs were ever deprived of the right of 
passage whether going to the mine or returning there-
from. 
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A fair interpretation of the above testinwny in 
defendants' view is that the very pres8nce of the picket 
line served as a restraint even though no threats of 
violence were made, but plaintiffs thought if they hauled 
coal there could be trouble. In other words, Odendahl 
and the plaintiffs assumed there could be violence if 
they hauled coal and their assumptions did not arise 
out of any \Vords or conduct of the pickets, but because 
of some unpleasant experienc-es they had had in years 
pa~t under unknown conditions with other persons. The 
evidence sustains this proposition. When :\Ir. Odendahl 
wa~ asked if the plaintiffs could not continue to haul 
coal to the railroad cars (i.e., from the mine to the rail-
road cars at Price, F tah) under peaceful picketing, hi8 
answer was, ''\Ye never know when picketing is peace-
ful or unpeaceful" (155 ). He went on to say that trucks 
have been rocked until they have been upset (in the past) 
and if he was a truck driver he would hesitate before 
ero~~ing a picket line (155). This testimony was con-
cerning past experience with other pickets, under other 
ei n·mn~tances. His fears did not grow out of any words 
or ads on the part of those defendants who served on 
the picket line, but rather out of acts of other people at 
different tinws and places and under circun1stances \Yith 
whi<'h we .are not acquainted. It \\'ould he fair to 8ay that 
he wa~ apprehensive of picket lines in general. There is 
no ·evidence fr01n l\lr. Odendahl that this particular picket 
line threatened hiln or his en1ployees in any Inanner what-
~OPYf'r. or that the picketing herein was other than peace-
ful and orderly. He had instructed hi~ Inen not to go 
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through this picket line when it was first discovered. 
Therefore, nothing which the pickets may have said or 
done caused him to lease his mine to the plaintiffs, but 
rather his inherent fear of picket lines in general. He 
does not make any distinction between peaceful picketing 
or violent picketing, contending that he does not know 
when picketing is peaceful or "unpeaceful." However, 
the law does take cognizance of and sanctions peaceful 
picketing. 
Plaintiff Sutton testified that he was not threatened 
with bodily injury by the pickets as aforesaid (122). He 
added significantly that he "wasn't going to take the 
chance" (of going through the picket line) ( 122). When 
asked if he knew whether there would have been any 
threats of violence if he did go through the picket line, 
Jfr. Sutton attempted to go into what had happened 
in the past (122) in dealing with others. This is not 
material here. lie was basing his objection to the pick-
ets, not because of what they had done or said, but upon 
his presumption of what might happen because of some 
unpleasant experiences in the past with others (122). 
~lr. Sutton testified that each time he was stopped, 
he was told by the pickets that they thought it would 
he better if he joined the union and made it a union mine 
(12:3). He discussed this matter with the pickets at son1e 
length when he stopped (123). This evidence shows that 
the picketing had for its J>Urpose peaceful persuasion. 
The men tried to persuade Mr. Sutton by orderly con-
versation that it would be to his advantage and to the 
advantage of the other plaintiffs if he unionized the 
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m1ne. Mr. Sutton testified that this was the general 
conversation each time he stopped and talked to the 
pickets. This fact, coupled with his testimony above to 
the effect that he was not threatened with bodily harm 
by the pickets, corroborate defendants' position that the 
picketing was peaceful and was formed to induce, by 
lawful persuasion, the unionization of said mine. 
nir. Sutton also testified to the effect that there was 
no use going up there (to the mine) after the first times 
as long as the picket line was there ( 123). Sutton told 
Frank Steiningar not to "buck" the picket line (382). 
Sutton sent Steining.ar up in the first place (on February 
23, 1956) because he thought there would be no picket 
line that day (382). Sutton stated he expected Steiningar 
to turn around and con1e back if there was a picket line 
(382). Sutton further stated that he did not intend to 
work the mine as long as there was a picket line, because 
of aJiticipated trouble based upon presun1ption and not 
upon anything which actually happened at the picket 
line (384, lines 1-8). 
The above testunony of both Odendahl and plaintiff 
Sutton substantiates the proposition that neither had 
an~· intention of crossing the picket line frmn the very 
beginning: that they both feared picket lines generally. 
Both .advised their en1ployees and partners respectively 
not to eross or "buck .. the picket line. It was not Sutton's 
intPntion to opPratl' or haul coal while the picket Hne was 
on duty a:-; aforPsaid. The ven~ existence of the picket I I-
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n' line \Vas sufficient restraint as far as plaintiff Sutton 
and his associa;tes were concerned. 
In International Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local No. 3 v. Utah Labor Relations Board (115 Utah 
183), 203 P. 2d 404, this Court held that otherwise lawful 
picketing was not made unlawful in spite of the mental 
reactions laboring men generally have regarding picket 
lines and their tendency to respect it. The Court, after 
citation of nu1nerous authorities, held the picketing in-
volved was an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed 
free speech. 
~ o threats or violence were necessary under the 
circumstances herein. No coal was hauled or was at-
tempted to be hauled during the picketing. The mine was 
shut down from the commencement of the picketing 
pending settle1nent of the dispute. Plaintiffs made trips 
to the n1ine for the purpose of inspecting the property 
and not for producing coal ( 12:3). The mere presence 
of the pickets from the time the planitiffs took over the 
mine was the reason for the 8hut down and not on ac-
count of any words or acts by the pickets. 
Under the above circumstances the question arises 
what is the materiality of what the pickets said or did 
as long as plaintiffs did not intend to operate or cross 
the picket line in any event 1 l\1 r. Sutton has told us that 
he was not going to take the chance of crossing the picket 
line as long as the pickets were present. 
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The issue here is not whether the picketing wa~ 
peaceful or otherwise. The real objection of the plaintiffs 
was to any picketing whatsoever. In all their pleadings 
they have asked the court to enjoin all picketing. 
We submit that the evidence in this case does not 
support a finding that the picketing was unlawful. How-
ever, to reverse this case, this Court need not go this 
far. This is an equity case and on appeal the Supreme 
Court n1ay examine the evidence and determine whether 
or not the findings and judgment are against the weight 
of the evidence. If this court should be of the cpinion 
that the findings are against the weight of the evidence, 
it should then make findings of its own and enter a 
judg1nent in accordance therewith. Certainly the testi-
Inony in this case clearly preponderates in favor of the 
defendants. The evidence establishes by a preponderance 
that the defendants were engaged in excercising their 
right to picket, to inforn1 the public of their position, and 
were attempting to persuade the plaintiffs to unionize 
their 1nine. rnder the authorities this court in such a 
~ituation should 1nake its ow'!l findings and enter a judg-
ment in favor of the defendants herein. 
Corey u. Roberts, S~ Utah 4-l-5. ~5 P. ~d 940: Transfer 
Rt'a11,1! Co. r. Litchfield. S-t l~tah 163, 33 P. ~d 179 (Re-
hearing denied S5 r-tah -l-51. 39 P. ~d 752): Greco r. 
Ontko, S!l lTtah ~-l-1. 39 P. :2d 318: Chapman r. Troy 
!Jtn111dr.11 ('o .. S7 Utah 15, -l-7 P. 2d 1054: ChrisfPnson r. 
X if'!snu. SS t Ttah 336, 54 P. 2d 430: Skala 'l: • .l/ errill. 
91 Utah ~!l:~, (i-t P. ~d lS!l. 
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POINT IV 
PEACEFUL PICKE'T1NG IS THE LEGITIMATE EXER-
CISE OF FREE SPEECH, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PUR-
POSE THEREOF IS TO INDUCE PLAINTIFFS WHO 
OPERATE WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP TO JOIN UNION. 
fn Cafeteria Ernployees Union v. Angelos, supra, 
plaintiffs owned and operated a cafeteria as partners 
without the aid of any employees. The defendant labor 
union picketed the cafeteria in an attempt to organize 
it. A New York Court granted an injunction on the 
grounds there was no "labor dispute" within the meaning 
of the New York Anti-Injunction Act. The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed the judgment, stating at page 1:27 of 
6-l: S. Ct.: 
"But, as we have heretofore decided, a state 
cannot exclude working men in a particular in-
dustry from putting their case to the public in a 
peaceful way 'by drawing the circle of econornic 
competition ... so small as to contain only an 
employer and those directly employed by him.' 
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 r. S. 
at page 326, 61 S. Ct. at page 570, 85 L. Ed. 855, 
Cf. Bakery & Pa.stry Drivers Local v. W ohl, 315 
U. H. 769, 62 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178." 
In Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 
4-68, ;)7 N. Ct. 857, 81 L. F~d. 1229, .an action was brought 
h:v Senn in the state court seeking an injunction to re-
strain picketing and partieularly publishing that the 
plaintiff was unfair to organized labor and to the de-
fendant unions, etc.. Senn eomplained that the union 
'!"· pieketed his place of business and also sent letters to 
arrhiteets and contractors requesting them not to patron-
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ize hirn because he was conducting a nonunion shop and 
threatening to picket them if they did so. Senn was the 
proprietor of a small business and he and his employees 
declined to join the Tile Layers' Union. When he re-
fused to sign a contract which barred him from working 
at his trade with his employees, the union peacefully 
picketed his pl~ace of business. 
The state court denied an injunction under a Wis-
consin statute allowing labor to use that form of eco-
nomic pressure. He appealed to the U. S. Supreme 
Court upon a contention that the statute of \Yisconsin 
abridged his right under the Fourteenth .Amendment to 
work under conditions of his own choice. The lT. S. 
Supreme Court affirmed the judgrnent. 
The unions in the Senn case conceded that Senn, so 
long as he conducts a nonunion shop, has the right to 
work with his hands and tools, and that he may do so, 
a:-; freely as he 1nay work his e1nployees longer hours 
and at lower wages than the union rules permit. But the 
unions contended that since Senn 's excercise of the right 
to do so was hannful to the interest of their nwmbers, 
the~· rnay seek hy legal rneans to induce him to agree to 
unionize his shop and to refrain frmn excercising his 
right to work with his own hands. The Suprerne Court 
of' \\'is<·onsin held that both the rneans ernployed and the 
pnd:-; sought b~· the unions were legal under its law. 
The question the Supreme Court of the United States 
was nskPd to dt\eide was whether either the nwans or 
1lt<' ends sought were forbidden by the federal consti-
tution. The h ighPst court in the land held that the rneans 
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which the state statute authorizes, to-wit: picketing and 
:~~~ publicity, were not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court then stated : 
":Members of a union might, without special 
statutory .authorization by a state, make known 
the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech 
is guaranteed by the Feder.al Constitution. The 
state may, in the exercise of its police power, 
regulate the methods and means of publicity as 
well as the use of public streets. If the end sought 
by the unions is not forbidden by the Federal 
Constitution, the state may authorize working 
men to seek to attain it by combining as pickets, 
just as it permits capitalists and employers to 
combine in other ways to attain their desired 
economic ends." 
The Supreme Court said further in the Senn case : 
"There is nothing in the Federal Constitution 
which forbids unions from competing with non-
union concerns for customers by means of picket-
ing as freely as one merchant competes with 
another by means of advertisernents in the press, 
by circulars, or by his window display. Each 
member of the unions, as well as Senn, has the 
right to strive to earn his living. Senn seeks to 
do so through exercise of his individual skill and 
planning. The union members seek to do so 
through cornbination. Earning a living is de-
pendent upon securing work; and securing work 
is dependent upon public favor. To win the 
patronage of the public each may strive h.v legal 
means. Exercising its police power, Wisconsin 
has declared that in a labor dispnt<>, peaceful 
picketing and truthful publicity are means legal 
for unions. It is true that disclosure of the facts 
of the labor dispute may be annoying to Senn 
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even if the method and means employed in giving 
the publicity are inherently unobjectionable. But 
such annoyance, like that often suffered from 
publicity and other connections, is not an invasion 
of the liberty guaranteed by the constitution. 
Compare Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. United 
States R. Labor Board, 261 r.S. 72, 43 S. Ct. 278, 
67 L. Ed. 536. It is true, also, that disclosure 
of the facts n1ay prevent Senn from securing jobs 
which he hoped to get. But a hoped-for job if: 
not property guaranteed by the Constitution. And 
the diversion of it to a competitor is not invasion 
of a constitutional right." 
In Bakery and P. Drirers Local 'C. TV old (1942), 315 
F. S., 769 G:2 S. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178, the Supreme 
Court held that to enjoin a labor unio:-.1 frmn peacefully 
picketing independent or '"peddler" distributors of bak-
ery products, who perfonned all their own work and 
haYe no emplo~·ees, for the purpose of securing employ-
ment for union members, was to unconstitutionally in-
fringe upon the right of free speech guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution, and further: 
"So far as we can ascertain frmn the opinions 
delivered frmn the state courts in this case, those 
courts were concerned only with the question 
whether there was involYed a labor dispute with-
in the meaning of the X ew York statutes and 
assumed the legality of the injunction followed 
from a determination that such a dispute wa::' 
not involved. Of course, that does not follow: 
one need not be in a 'labor dispute' as defined by· 
~tate law to have .a right under the Fourteenth 
Anwndment to express a grievance in a labor 
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n1atter by publication unattended by violence, 
coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or op-
pressive." 
See also Angelos v. 1l!l esevich, 289 N. Y. 498, 46 N.E. 
2d 903; Naprawa v. Chicago Flat Janitors Union, 315 
Ill. App. 328, 43 N. E. 2d 198; Coons v. J mtrneymen 
Barbers, 222 Minn. 100, 23 N. W. 2d, 345; Lo Bianco 
v. Holt, 189 Misc. 113, 70 N.Y.S. 2d 33; Kellar v. Sttn, 
93 N. Y. 2d 165. 
I also wish to direct the court's at~tention to the 
following authorities on the general status of peaceful 
picketing as related to the constitutional guarantee of 
free speech : 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88; Carlson v. Cal-
~i.fornia, 310 U. S . ., 106; State of Washington ex rel Lum-
ber and Sawmill Workers v. Superior Court, 164 P. 2d 
662; 1Vlilk Wagon Drivers Union v. Lake Valley Farm 
Products, 311 U. S. 91, 61 S. Ct. 122, 85 L. Ed. 63; U.S. 
v. Iiutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788; 
In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, .184 P. 2d 892. 
Plaintiffs' ground this action upon the Utah Right 
to Work Act. Their position, in brief, is to the effect 
that said Act guarantees the plaintiffs the right to work 
without becoming members of any union and defendants 
by picketing are seeking to deny the plaintiffs their 
rights under said Act. IIowever, the Utah Right to 
Work Act exempts peaceful persuasion, which according 
to the defendants, is what they were engaged jn doing 
when enjoined by the trial court. The California Su-
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preme Court, in Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 
P. 2d 343, stated as follows about the right to work: 
''The right to work, either in emploVlnent or 
independent business, is fundamental"' and, no 
doubt, enjoys the protection of the personal lib-
erty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the federal Constitution, as well as the more 
specific provisions of our state constitution. 
. . . . but this right, like othe:r:s equally funda-
mental, is not absolute. It is safeguarded from 
legislative action which discriminates against a 
person or class of persons in respect to oppor-
tunities to obtain work or enter into business. 
(Yick 'Yo Hopkins, 118 r. S. 356, 6 S .Ct. 1064, 
30 L. Ed. 220: Abe v. Fish and Game Commission, 
9 Cal. App. 2d 300, 49 P. 2d 608); and it is als~ 
protected in some degree against arbitrary action 
by private organizations, including employr·rs and 
labor unions. J mnes v. :Jiarinship Corp., supra. 
But it is subject to n1any legislati-ve restrictions 
fmniliar to all. such as statutorv limitations on 
working hours~ nlinin1un1 wages: .age limits for 
employment, licensing acts. safety regulations, 
and a host of others. It is equally subJect to 
peaceful economic pressure by labor m·ganizations 
seeking 1e_qitimate euds, such as conditions of 
1rork, co1lediz'e rather than indiridual bargaining, 
seniority pri r i1e,ncs and other methods of ad-
raHr('mnd, aud tlle union or closed shop ... :'' 
(Citing- eaf'es). (~fv emphasis). 
In connection with the Right to "~ ork Art, defend-
ants wish to point out that five of their Ineinbers were 
denied tlw right to work when they 'vere not permitted 
to n•tnrn to their jobf' h~· reason of their wish to organize 
tlw 1nine at which the~· had been eu1ployed and which 
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is involved herein and that they were repeatedly told 
that if they joined the union the mine would have to 
shut down and there would be no work for them. 
The defendants herein sought legitimate ends in 
that they were picketing for recognition of the union to 
which they wished to attach themselves and were exer-
cising the rights guaranteed to them under Section 7 
of the Taft Hartley Act and Utah Labor Statutes as 
aforesaid. They had a right even under the: Utah Right 
to Work Act to use peaceful persuasion to accomplish 
these ends. We have heretofore noted that their conduct 
\\·as not violent and, therefore, they were acting within 
their rights under the Utah Right to Work Act. 
Defendants firmly believe that the court erred in 
restraining all picketing and that the court should not 
have restrained picketing which was lawful and peaceful. 
Of necessity, by restraining all picketing, the Court did 
restrain peaceful and lawful picketing, which .are in-
cluded in the term all picketing. If in fact the picketing 
herein was violent, the Court should have restrained 
those specific acts constituting the violence rather than 
in sweeping tenns enjoining all picketing. See Weber 
v. Anheuser-Busch 348 U. S. 480; Milk Wagon Drivers' 
Union etc. v. ill eadowmoor Dairies, supra. 
Note that in the Meadow1noor case the acts of 
violence were of great magnitude and continuing. The 
master who investigated for the Court found that there 
had been violence on a considerable scale. Witnesses 
testified to more than fifty instances of window smash-
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ing; explosive bombs causing substantial injury to plants; 
stench bombs dropped in five stores; three trucks of 
vendors were wrecked; and a store was set on fire. In 
the course of· its opinion, the Court said, "These acts of 
violence are not episodic nor isolated:' The Court also 
said: "And so the right of free speech cannQt be denied 
by drawing from a trivial rough incident or a moment of 
animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise peace-
ful picketing has the taint of forc-e." 
In the Anheuser-Busch case, supra, the r.S. Su-
preme Court said that the picketing involved therein 
did not preclude the conclusion that the transportation 
was stopped for fear of crossing an otherwise peaceful 
picket line and that in any ·event the state court enjoined 
all picketing. The case was reversed and re1nanded and 
we feel that the conclusions hereinabove cited from said 
case apply with equal force to the case at bar. 
Defendants are finnly of the opinion that the Court 
in this ease, even if it disregarded the proposition that 
the plaintiffs did not cross the picket line because of 
fear of what nlight or could happen rather than any con-
duct on the part of the pickets. still should have enjoined 
only such act~ as it found frmn the evidence to be violent 
or in the nature of threats and should not have enjoined 
in its permanent injunction all picketing which prevented 
the defendant~ from exercising tlwir right under the Taft 
llartlt'~· Ad, the Utah Labor Statutes aboye ci.ted, in-
cluding the ·utah Right to "\rork Art, to engage in peace-
ful piekPting for organizational and other lawful labor 
pnrpOSPS. 
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CONCLUSION 
Peaceful and lawful picketing is a right which is 
secured to citizens of this country by the constitutional 
provisions prot·e:cting freedmn of speech. We believe 
that the findings and judgment of the trial court have 
denied to defendants this very important right. These 
defendants have been prohibited by the trial court from 
engaging in any type of picketing. On the very face of 
the judgment it appears that the court has violated de,.. 
fendants' rights. It enjoins the defendants from "all 
picketing." 
In the first place this case should not have been 
considered by the courts of this state. Plaintiffs are en-
gaged in interstate commerce and Congress has created 
a tribunal to take care of labor disputes such as the 
present. The National Labor Relations Board is the 
tribunal before which plaintiffs should have submitted 
their cause, if any. Whether or not the National Labor 
Relations Board would take cognizance of this case 
is of no concern to the courts of the State of Utah. 
We submit that this court should reverse the judg-
ment of the trial court and direct that a judgment be 
entered in favor of the defendants, thereby assuring 
defendants of their right to peacefully picket, to in-
form the public of their cause .and to persuade the plain-
tiffs to unionize their mine. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD SHEYA 
Counsel for Appellamts 
Bonomo Building 
Price, Utah 
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